## Message Text

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FOR AMBASSADOR TOON

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, IS, US

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S LUNCHEON MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON, FRIDAY, MARCH 12, 1976

- 1. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY HAD TWO HOURS OF CORDIAL DISCUSSION WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON FRIDAY AFTERNOON, INCLUDING LUNCHEON AND A BRIEF PRIVATE MEETING. A RANGE OF SUBJECTS WAS DISCUSSED, PARTICULARLY THE NEXT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATION AND THE C-130'S FOR EGYPT. END SUMMARY.
- 2. NEXT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATION: THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT AMBASSADOR EILTS HAD JUST BEEN IN TO SEE SADAT TO DISCUSS THE GENERAL CONCEPT WE HAD IN MIND. SADAT HAD SAID HE WANTED UNTIL NEXT WEEK TO THINK ABOUT IT BEFORE REPLYING. ALLON ASKED THE SECRETARY'S ESTIMATE. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE SAW A NUMBER OF DIFFICULTIES; AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE ARABS WOULD NOT KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. SECRET

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BASICALLY WE DID NOT KNOW BECAUSE WE DID NOT YET HAVE THE

VIEWS OF ANY OF THE ARAB GOVERNMENTS. HE THOUGHT SADAT MIGHT GO FORWARD WITH IT IF THE SYRIANS DO. ASAD, HE NOTED, HAD STOPPED JUST A SHADE SHORT OF REJECTING IT (IN HIS SPEECH EARLIER IN THE WEEK). WE WOULD PRESENT THE

IDEA TO HUSSEIN WHEN HE WAS HERE -- THE 29TH OF MARCH -- AND TO ASAD AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR URGENT DELIBERATIONS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL ABOUT THE CONTENT OF EITHER THE TERRITORIAL OR POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROPOSAL UNTIL WE HEARD FROM THE ARABS THAT SUCH A NEGOTIATION WAS POSSIBLE. ALLON SAID THE PRIME MINISTER HAD HANDLED IT VERY SKILLFULLY, OBTAINING A CABINET CONSENSUS IN TWO STAGES, FIRST ON EGYPT AND SYRIA AND THEN INCLUDING JORDAN. THE SECRETARY SAID HE APPRECIATED THAT IT WAS A BIG DECISION AND A USEFUL DECISION. ALLON REMARKED THAT EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL WAS SUGGESTING AN END TO THE STATE OF WAR, THIS DID NOT MEAN PEACE WASN'T STILL THE PREFERRED OBJECTIVE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD.

3. C-130'S FOR EGYPT: THE SECRETARY RAISED THE QUESTION, URGING THE GOI NOT RPT NOT TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE CONGRESS TO BLOCK THE C-130 SALE. ALLON SAID THAT THIS ISSUE ERUPTED NOT BY A GOI INITIATIVE BUT BECAUSE OF STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFINGS ON THE HILL ABOUT A LONG-TERM MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THIS. BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT WE WOULD NOT COMPROMISE ON THE C-130'S. WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR IN SUBMITTING THE NOTIFICATION OF THE LETTER OF OFFER THAT APPROVAL SET NO PRECEDENT. WE HAD TRIED TO ACCOMMODATE ISRAEL'S CONCERNS. AMBASSADOR EILTS HAD CONFIRMED THAT MANY OF THE ITEMS WE HAD MENTIONED IN OUR CONCEPTUAL PAPERS WOULD NOT EVEN BE DESIRED BY THE EGYPTIANS. BUT THE PRESIDENT WAS DETER-MINED TO GET APPROVAL OF THE C-130'S. THERE WAS NO PRACTICAL WAY TO DO IT BY COMMERCIAL SALE. SCOWCROFT INTERJECTED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE BUT COMPLICATED. (LATER, IN SEEING OFF THE FOREIGN MINISTER. THE SECRETARY TOLD THE PRESS THAT WE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO GO THE FMS ROUTE BUT A CONGRESSIONAL DECISION TO PERMIT THE C-130 SALE WOULD NOT IMPLY AN OBLIGATION TO VOTE FOR ANY-SECRET

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THING ELSE. HE SAID NO OTHER REQUESTS WERE NOW PLANNED. BUT HE INDICATED TO ALLON BEFORE ALLON GOT INTO HIS CAR THAT WE COULD NOT ABSOLUTELY EXCLUDE THAT NECESSITY MIGHT REQUIRE THAT SOME OTHER GESTURE BE MADE THIS YEAR.)

4. ISRAEL IN THE UN: ALLON MENTIONED THAT SYRIA APPARENTLY PLANNED NEW ACTIVITY AT THE UN TO EXPEL ISRAEL OR DENY ITS CREDENTIALS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE HOPED

WE COULD PREVENT THIS. HE SUGGESTED WE WORK WITH THE MORE RESPONSIBLE LDC'S AND WITH NATO AND THE EC-9. THE SECRETARY AGREED, SAYING HE WOULD TAKE UP THE QUESTION AT THE SPRING NATO MINISTERIAL. HE SAID THAT HE HAD WARNED THE LATIN AMERICANS AGAINST IT WHEN HE HAD VISITED THERE.

- 5. AFRICA: ALLON HOPED THAT ON THE SECRETARY'S AFRICAN TRIP IN LATE APRIL HE WOULD PUT IN A GOOD WORD ABOUT RESTORING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. THE SECRETARY ASSURED HIM HE WOULD. ALLON SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S SUGGESTION IN SPAIN HAD PRODUCED SOME INITIAL SPANISH-ISRAELI CONTACT.
- 6. TRANSITIONAL QUARTER: ALLON SAID THAT CONGRESSMEN WERE COMPLAINING ABOUT LACK OF ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT FOR FUNDING FOR ISRAEL FOR THE FIFTH QUARTER. SOME OFFICIALS WERE BRIEFING CONGRESS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS AGAINST IT. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR POSITION WAS, AS WE HAD SAID, THAT WE COULD NOT ASK FOR IT BUT WE WOULD ACQUIESCE IF CONGRESS VOTED IT.
- 7. ARMS DELIVERIES: WHEN ALLON RAISED THE MATTER OF SPEEDED-UP ARMS DELIVERIES, SCOWCROFT REPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE AN ANSWER EARLY NEXT WEEK. SOME ITEMS, BUT NOT MANY, COULD POSSIBLY BE SPEEDED UP.
- 8. HORN OF AFRICA: ALLON REMARKED THAT THE HORN OF AFRICA (ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, THE FRENCH TERRITORIES) WAS WORRISOME. HE WONDERED IF THE FRENCH AND ETHIOPIANS COULDN'T BE URGED TO BE ON THEIR GUARD AGAINST SOVIET PENETRATION. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THIS NEEDED TO BE WATCHED CLOSELY. HE PROMISED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH DINITZ IN TWO WEEKS AFTER WE COMPLETED OUR OWN STUDIES.

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- 9. BIG POWER RELATIONS: ALLON ASKED THE SECRETARY'S ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET AND CHINESE POLICIES. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS WORRIED THAT WE WERE LOSING ALL LEVERAGE OVER THE SOVIETS BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES. THE CHINESE, HE FELT, WERE DRAWING THE SAME CONCLUSION ABOUT US AND WERE CLEARLY RETAINING FOR THEMSELVES THE OPTION OF MOVING AWAY FROM US, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD NOT YET DONE SO.
- 10. OIL PURCHASES: IN THE BRIEF PRIVATE CONVERSATION, ALLON ASKED AGAIN ABOUT WHETHER SUPPORTING ASSISTANCE COULD BE USED TO PURCHASE NON-U.S. OIL IF IT WAS BOUGHT FROM U.S. COMPANIES. THE SECRETARY CALLED THE LEGAL ADVISER, MONROE LEIGH, WHO INDICATED THAT THE ISRAELI IDEAS ON HOW THIS COULD BE DONE HAD SOME MERIT. THE

SECRETARY THEN ASSURED AL	LON THAT IF IT WERE LEGALLY
POSSIBLE IT WOULD BE DONE.	KISSINGER

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